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1STATELESSNESS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE: 
A CONCEPT WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
IJRL Special Issue 2016
Michelle Foster∗ and Hélène Lambert∗
1. INTRODUCTION
The protection of stateless persons has long been understood as a challenge for the 
international community, yet for many of the past sixty years a prioritized focus on 
refugees has dominated, indeed arguably eclipsed, the plight and protection needs of 
stateless persons. As Guy S Goodwin-Gill has observed, there is an irony in that 
‘refugees and stateless persons once walked hand in hand’:1 after the First World War 
‘their numbers and condition were almost coterminous’,2 and post–Second World 
War the intention had been to draft a single convention for the protection of both 
stateless persons and refugees. However, the consignment of a protection regime for 
stateless persons first to an annex and ultimately to excision from the Refugee 
Convention undoubtedly contributed to a lack of concentrated effort to address the 
plight and protection needs of this category of ‘unprotected persons,3 notwithstanding 
the subsequent formulation of the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons in 
19544 and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in 1961.5
Goodwin-Gill has long argued for a refocus of international attention and 
effort on the plight, predicament, and protection needs of stateless persons. In a 
seminal contribution over two decades ago he observed that statelessness was 
perceived by many as a mere ‘technical problem’,6 involving the potential remedy of 
‘harmonization of laws and co-ordination [of] rules’, hence likely lacking ‘the 
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2fashionable touch’.7 In his view, however, ‘the tragedy is that few commentators or 
practitioners ever looked beyond, to the underlying human rights issues’, the central 
thesis of his contribution being that ‘statelessness is indeed a broad human rights 
issue, even as it retains a distinct technical dimension’.8 He argued that the 
international community had evolved to a level of sophistication such that the time 
was ripe for a reconceptualization of the problem of statelessness and a renewed focus 
on its identification and eradication. He observed:
Hitherto, international co-operation in improving the status of stateless 
persons, or in reducing or eliminating statelessness, has enjoyed limited 
success, often disappearing down relatively unproductive paths. The time has 
come for a revision of such arrangements, deconstruction of earlier analytical 
approaches, and their substitution with practical arrangements [which] reflect 
the principles generally shared by the community of nations.9 
In this contribution, we examine the challenge set by Goodwin-Gill for the 
international community, namely, the need for greater recognition and protection of 
stateless persons, in light of developments over the more than two decades that have 
passed since his incisive analysis. The key challenges set by Goodwin-Gill can be 
divided into three themes: factual, institutional and jurisprudential/doctrinal. We 
consider the first two briefly, before examining in more depth doctrinal developments, 
and in particular the degree to which advancements have been made in strengthening 
the right to acquisition of nationality, as well as the right to protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality. We note positive developments and highlight 
ongoing challenges. 
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 
Convention) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 
Convention) together form the foundation of the international legal framework to 
address statelessness.10 A stateless person is defined as ‘a person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’,11 this definition 
being considered part of customary international law.12 According to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), determining whether a person is considered a 
national by a state under the operation of its law requires a careful analysis of how a 
state applies its nationality laws in practice, in each individual case.13 In other words, 
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3The 1954 Convention is designed to ‘regulate and improve the status of 
stateless persons by an international agreement’15 by setting out a range of rights to 
which stateless persons are entitled. The Convention mirrors the Refugee Convention 
in structure and format, although there are notable omissions in the 1954 Convention 
such as a lack of protection against refoulement and a lack of protection against 
penalization for illegal entry.16 Hence where a de jure stateless person is a refugee, 
protection should also be accorded under the 1951 Convention as it provides both a 
better standard of protection and is far more widely ratified and implemented in 
practice.
The 1961 Convention is designed to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
statelessness by imposing both positive and negative duties on states in relation to the 
prevention of statelessness. 
The historically low rate of accession and concomitant lack of implementation 
and enforcement of these treaties, including a lack of domestic status determination 
procedures in relation to the 1954 Convention, means that other human rights treaties 
have, as predicted by Goodwin-Gill, become important in the protection of stateless 
persons. While traditionally understood as a technical legal problem, it is in fact now 
widely appreciated that statelessness commonly occurs as a result of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, including on the basis of racial and gender discrimination. 
Arbitrary deprivation of nationality may take the form of failure to accord nationality, 
or of withdrawal of nationality on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. 
In addition, the consequences of statelessness are now increasingly conceived 
of in human rights terms, given that statelessness frequently results in discrimination 
in terms of accessing basic rights such as to work, to health care, and to education in 
one’s own country, and can lead to vulnerability to other human rights violations such 
as being trafficked.17 Indeed, some stateless persons find that their predicament in 
their country of origin or habitual residence is so untenable that migration is the only 
alternative.18 In this regard, increased international focus on the need to establish 
status determination procedures to identify and ensure protection of stateless persons 
in a migratory context is an important although still nascent legal development. 
Further, a growing body of jurisprudence recognizing arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality and its consequences as persecution pursuant to the Refugee Convention is 
another important development. 
However, notwithstanding such developments, which support Goodwin-Gill’s 
sense that in relation to this issue ‘there is room for optimism today’,19 significant 
challenges remain.
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42. THE CONSTITUENCY MUST BE KNOWN
A simple yet profoundly important observation made by Goodwin-Gill in 1994 was 
that ‘[n]o one knows how many stateless people there are in the world’,20 and that this 
‘paucity of information is due to the absence of serious attention to their plight by any 
international organization’.21 Accordingly, his first key recommendation was that ‘the 
constituency must be known’.22 
More than two decades later this challenge remains an acute one, such that one 
of the UNHCR’s ten key actions to eradicate statelessness is to ‘improve quantitative 
and qualitative data on stateless populations’.23 The extent of the challenge is 
highlighted in UNHCR’s ‘starting point’ for concluding this action item, namely that 
quantitative population data on stateless populations is currently publicly available for 
only seventy-five states, while qualitative analysis on stateless populations is publicly 
available for only forty-five states.24 As the UNHCR observes, stateless persons 
frequently are not only undocumented, but are also ignored by authorities and not 
counted in national administrative registries and databases or in population 
censuses.25 There is also the inherent challenge in collecting information about 
stateless persons given that they may be unwilling to be identified ‘because they lack 
a secure legal status’.26
This is not to say that progress has not been made. There is increasing 
attention, including from within the academic research community, to issues of 
statelessness and hence much more is known about specific stateless populations.27 
The work of institutions such as the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion has been 
key in highlighting gaps in UNHCR’s statistics and in identifying the challenges 
associated with quantifying statelessness.28 In addition, the work of non-government 
and regional networks, such as the European Migration Network and of the European 
Network on Statelessness, has been crucial to highlighting the issue and its scope, and 
facilitating co-ordinated efforts at prevention and remedy.29 Finally, the increase in 
the establishment of national determination procedures will likely lead to ‘new data in 
countries hosting stateless migrants’,30 although it should be acknowledged that this 
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5Clearly, however, the inadequacy of empirical data remains a pertinent and 
crucial challenge to the protection of stateless persons globally.
3. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: THE NEED FOR AN 
APPROPRIATE AGENCY
One of the key recommendations put forward by Goodwin-Gill was that ‘effective 
protection of the rights of stateless persons must be entrusted to an appropriate 
international agency, in a mandate that goes beyond the essentially reactive and non-
functional tasks so far conferred upon UNHCR’.31 Since this statement was made in 
1994, the work of the UNHCR concerning stateless persons and statelessness has 
been very substantive.
UNHCR’s responsibilities to address statelessness were initially limited to 
stateless persons who were refugees.32 In particular, the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention, although largely modelled on the 1951 Refugee Convention, does not 
repose supervisory authority in the UNHCR equivalent to article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention. In the mid-1970s, the UNHCR’s mandate was expanded to cover persons 
falling under the terms of the 1961 Convention.33 As Seet has explained, the UNHCR 
attempted to ‘engage states on statelessness during the Cold War, exceeding its formal 
powers in doing so’, yet states ‘remained indifferent’.34 However, in December 1995, 
the UNHCR was finally entrusted with responsibilities for stateless persons generally, 
as part of its statutory function.35 The UNGA in particular expressed concern ‘that 
statelessness, including the inability to establish one’s nationality, may result in 
displacement’ and stressed ‘that the prevention and reduction of statelessness and the 
protection of stateless persons are important also in the prevention of potential 
refugee situations’.36 It further requested the UNHCR ‘actively to promote accession 
to’ the 1954 Convention and 1961 Convention and ‘to provide relevant technical and 
advisory services pertaining to the preparation and implementation of nationality 
legislation to interested States’.37 A great deal more detail on how the UNHCR was to 
implement its mandate was provided in the Executive Committee’s 2006 conclusion 
on ‘Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of 
Stateless Persons’,38 which was endorsed by the UNGA.39 In 2011, the UN Secretary-
31
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32
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6General declared that ‘[t]he UN should tackle both the causes and consequences of 
statelessness as a key priority within the Organization’s broader efforts to strengthen 
the rule of law’.40
In recent years the work of the UNHCR has been integral to a renewed 
impetus given to statelessness as an issue worthy of study and focus. In particular, the 
50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention in 2011, and the 60th anniversary of the 
1954 Convention in 2014, provided opportunities for focusing international attention 
on this historically overlooked issue. The UNHCR organized and hosted a ministerial-
level conference in 2011,41 where states recognized (inter alia):
…that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons are the principal 
international statelessness instruments, which provide important standards for 
the prevention and resolution of statelessness and safeguards for the protection 
of stateless people. We will consider becoming a party to them, where 
appropriate, and/or strengthening our policies that prevent and reduce 
statelessness.42
In addition, sixty-one states made statelessness-specific pledges, including thirty-three 
states pledging to accede to, or to take steps to accede to, one of both of the 
Statelessness Conventions.43 Forty-one states made pledges relating to a range of 
other issues, including effecting law reform to prevent or reduce statelessness, to 
implement better civil registration and documentation systems to prevent and reduce 
statelessness, to establish statelessness determination procedures, and to undertake 
studies and mapping initiatives.44
The UNHCR has also spearheaded important developments in legal principle: 
specifically, from 2010 the UNHCR organized a series of high-level expert meetings 
that have led to the rapid development of a series of guidelines on ‘key doctrinal 
issues’45 in interpreting the two pivotal treaties.46
As a result of these initiatives, ratifications have increased at an exponential 
rate. For example, Goodwin-Gill observed that, as at 1 January 1989, the 1954 
Convention had just thirty-six ratifications, while the 1961 Convention had even 
fewer at fifteen.47 By contrast, in 2016,48 the 1954 Convention has eighty-eight 
39
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Ministerial Communiqué’ (8 Dec 2011) <http://www.unhcr.org/4ee210d89.pdf> accessed 16 June 
2016.
42
 ibid para 3.
43
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(Geneva, Palais des Nations, 7–8 December 2011)’ (Oct 2012) 34–35 
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7parties, with one quarter of the total number of states parties acceding since 2011.49 In 
addition, the 1961 Convention currently has sixty-seven parties, with almost half of 
those accessions occurring since 2011.50
In arguably its most ambitious initiative to date, in 2014 the UNHCR launched 
its Global Action Plan to End Statelessness by 2024. The programme aims to 
eradicate statelessness ‘by resolving existing situations and preventing the emergence 
of new cases of statelessness’,51 and adopts ten specific actions to end statelessness.52 
Despite these considerable achievements, important challenges remain. The 
extent of the problem, and its neglect for so long, means that notwithstanding recent 
developments, the identification, prevention and reduction of statelessness and the 
protection of stateless persons ‘remain a work in progress’.53
A problematic issue is the fact that the UNHCR’s campaign to end 
statelessness by 2024 focuses solely on non-refugee stateless persons. This runs the 
risk that the situation of stateless refugees (see article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention) may continue to be overlooked. It also may result in a disconnection 
with issues of the prevention and reduction of statelessness in the refugee context. 
4. STATELESSNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES
The core issue identified by Goodwin-Gill in 1994 as needing close attention was 
doctrinal. He observed that both greater clarity of existing principle and progressive 
development of the law were required in relation to several central issues, including 
the lawfulness of deprivation of citizenship, and that reference to developments in the 
protection of human rights, including non-discrimination norms, were important in 
this regard. Integrally connected to this issue is the need to ‘stop[] statelessness at 
source’54 by strengthening the principles governing acquisition of nationality and 
translating the ‘criteria of effective nationality into practical arrangements’.55 
Goodwin-Gill lamented that there was, at the time, insufficient analysis recognizing 
that both the causes and the effects of statelessness may implicate human rights 
issues, and that this manifested in various ways, including in a failure to recognize 
that some statelessness situations may give rise to qualification for refugee status.56
While no new international instruments directly on the subject have been 
devised,57 states’ discretion in the granting and withdrawal of nationality has 
undoubtedly come to be restrained by numerous prohibitions in international and 
regional human rights treaties regarding discrimination, and some regional 
developments have also proved particularly important. This has become an issue of 
growing practical significance, as has the question of refusal of return to the state of 
49
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50
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51
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8which one is a national in the light of recent efforts by states to restrict the activities 
of ‘home-grown terrorists’. Notions of statelessness and arbitrariness are pertinent in 
this debate.
4.1. Acquisition of nationality including principle of ‘effective nationality’
Goodwin-Gill argued that steps ‘should be taken to establish common 
understandings with respect to the principles that might reasonably govern the 
acquisition of nationality in modern society, with a view to stopping statelessness at 
source’.58 
Here some progress has been made, particularly in treaty law. Unlike its 
predecessor (the 1930 Hague Convention), the 1961 Convention imposes a positive 
obligation on states to grant nationality in certain circumstances (on the basis of jus 
soli). It also addresses a number of specific situations such as the nationality of 
foundlings, and of those born on board ships or aircraft etc. Thus, although the 1961 
Convention does not recognize a general right of individual to a nationality, it 
attempts to reduce particular instances of statelessness, and imposes obligations on 
states to grant nationality to stateless persons in certain cases.59 Of particular 
significance is the obligation to grant nationality to children born in the territory who 
would otherwise be stateless,60 which is now explicitly provided in the legislation of 
over 100 states, as well as regional treaties.61 For example, the American Convention 
on Human Rights imposes a general duty on a state to grant its nationality on the basis 
of birth on the state’s territory in the absence of a right to any other nationality.62 The 
1997 European Convention on Nationality (ECN) also provides a right to nationality 
based on jus soli for children who do not acquire at birth another nationality, albeit 
this may be conditioned on the person in question residing there lawfully and 
habitually.63 
While international human rights law does not explicitly impose a positive 
obligation on states to grant nationality, both general and specific human rights 
instruments contain relevant restrictions on state discretion on this issue. Article 24(3) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognises that 
‘[e]very child has the right to acquire a nationality’.64 Furthermore, article 7(1) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that a child ‘shall be registered 
immediately after birth’, which is an important procedural safeguard in preventing 
statelessness, and that a child ‘shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to 
acquire a nationality’.65 Finally, article 7(2) provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure 
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9obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular 
where the child would otherwise be stateless’. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women provides in article 9 that states
shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their 
nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor 
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically 
change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the 
nationality of the husband.66
It further provides that ‘States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with 
respect to the nationality of their children’.67 Given the prevalence of gender 
discrimination as a cause of statelessness, these provisions amount to a vital safeguard 
to reduce statelessness and ensure that women have the right to acquire nationality on 
an equal basis with men.68 The International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination specifically provides that laws relating to nationality, 
citizenship or naturalization must ‘not discriminate against any particular 
nationality’.69 And the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides 
in article 18 that states parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities have ‘the 
right to acquire and change a nationality’.70
Taking into account such developments, the UN Human Rights Council has 
stated that the right to a nationality is a fundamental human right.71 Most recently, the 
Council of the European Union has affirmed that ‘the right to a nationality is a 
fundamental legal right’.72
It must be acknowledged, however, that there are ongoing challenges in 
identifying a corresponding obligation on any particular state to recognize this right in 
other than specific contexts. Hence, while developments have advanced considerably 
since Goodwin-Gill wrote in the early 1990s, in many situations it remains the case 
that a person is not able to enforce their abstract right to a nationality against a 
66
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67
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68
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69
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70
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the Secretary-General’, UN doc A/HRC/25/28, 19 Dec 2013.
72
 Council of the European Union (n 29).
10
particular state,73 which in part explains why the UNHCR estimates that at least ten 
million people worldwide continue to be stateless. 
An intriguing and creative argument made by Goodwin-Gill to respond to this 
lacuna was that the principles governing acquisition of nationality needed to be 
strengthened and that the notion of effective nationality may be integral to such a 
development. He suggested innovatively that the criteria set out by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case to assess an individual’s genuine connection 
with a state in the context of diplomatic protection may have relevance beyond this 
limited context. In particular he observed that where these criteria are met, including 
‘a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments’,74 a state may be ‘considered bound by other incidental obligations, such 
as that of non-expulsion, readmission, and a certain standard of treatment’.75 
While we have not reached the position that this criterion of effective 
nationality has been translated ‘into practical arrangements, whereby the 
naturalization of those sufficiently attached to the territorial State might be 
facilitated’,76 jurisprudential developments in international and regional human rights 
law have progressed considerably closer to achieving this goal. 
First, it is clearly the case that regardless of citizenship status, all those within 
a state’s territory or jurisdiction are entitled to a ‘certain standard of treatment’. The 
widely ratified human rights treaties prohibit discrimination on grounds relevant to 
stateless persons including ‘national, ethnic or social origin … birth or other status’.77 
As the Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasized,
the enjoyment of rights stipulated in the Convention is not limited to children 
who are citizens of a State party and must therefore, if not explicitly stated 
otherwise in the Convention, also be available to all children – including 
asylum-seeking, refugee and migrant children – irrespective of their 
nationality, immigration status or statelessness.78
Human rights instruments by nature guarantee rights regardless of citizenship and 
access to or deprivation of nationality. As long held by the Human Rights Committee, 
‘the general rule is that each one of the rights in the [ICCPR] must be guaranteed 
without discrimination between citizens and aliens’.79 Indeed, all core international 
human rights treaties prohibit discrimination on ground of nationality. There are some 
exceptions to the rule that everyone (ie nationals and non-nationals) should be 
73
 For example, according to the Human Rights Committee, the ICCPR ‘does not necessarily make it 
an obligation for States to give their nationality to every child born in their territory’: UN Human 
Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 17: Article 24 (Rights of the Child)’, UN doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I), 27 May 2008, 195, para 8.
74
 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), judgment of 6 Apr 1955, ICJ Rep 1955, 4, 23.
75




 CRC art 2(1).
78
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 6 (2005): Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children outside Their Country of Origin’, UN doc CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 
Sep 2005, para 12.
79
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant’, UN doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I), 27 May 2008, 189, para 2.
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enjoying the same rights, but as exceptions, these provisions must be interpreted 
restrictively.80
Second and more fundamentally, the ultimate hallmark of citizenship, the right 
to remain, has been extended beyond formal citizenship in a manner that may have 
particular relevance to stateless persons. The right to return to one’s ‘own country’ as 
set out in article 12(4) of the ICCPR has long been understood to apply to a category 
of persons wider that those considered nationals by any state. In its 1999 General 
Comment, the Human Rights Committee explained that ‘the right to enter his own 
country’ goes beyond the right of entry to one’s country of nationality. It also applies 
to anyone who has ‘special ties or claims in relation to a given country’, such as 
stateless persons who have been unlawfully deprived of that country or stateless 
persons who are long-term residents of that country.81 
In Nystrom v Australia,82 the Human Rights Committee took the view that the 
deportation to Sweden of a Swedish national who had committed serious criminal 
offences in Australia was arbitrary, based on ‘the strong ties connecting him to 
Australia’.83 In particular the Committee acknowledged that there are factors ‘other 
than nationality which may establish close and enduring connections between a 
person and a country, connections which may be stronger than those of nationality’.84 
The Committee took into account ‘the strong ties connecting him to Australia, the 
presence of his family in Australia, the language he speaks, the duration of his stay in 
the country and the lack of any other ties than nationality with Sweden’.85 Mr 
Nystrom was not of course stateless, but the predicament of statelessness in the 
situation where a person has a similarly close connection as Mr Nystrom could only 
strengthen the claim that the relevant country is ‘one’s own’.
Analogous reasoning can be found in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
approach to assessing the legality of deportation of long-term residents against the 
protection, in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),86 
against unjustified interference with the right to family and private life.87 While the 
European Court has long been concerned with the ‘family life’ aspect of article 8 as it 
pertains to long-term residents, in more recent cases the Court has sought to explore 
80
 See, eg, ICCPR arts 13 and 25; ICERD art 1(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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81
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82
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Views: Communication No 1557/2007’, UN doc 
CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007, 1 Sep 2011 (Nystrom v Australia). 
83
 ibid paras 7.5–7.6. See also UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Views: Communication No 1959/2010’, 
UN doc CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010, 1 Sep 2011, paras 8.4–8.6 (Warsame v Canada). 
84
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85
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in more depth the meaning of the connected but separate concept of ‘private life’.88 In 
Slivenko v Latvia,89 the Grand Chamber of the Court considered the purported 
expulsion of a Soviet army officer and his family who had lived in Latvia most of 
their lives but were not citizens. The Court observed that although its main emphasis 
in the past had been on the family life aspect of article 8 in decisions concerning 
deportation or expulsion, the private life aspect offered distinct and possibly wider 
protection. In that case it was said that the deportation of the family violated their 
right to private life since they were ‘removed from the country where they had 
developed, uninterruptedly since birth, the network of personal, social and economic 
relations that make up the private life of every human being’.90 In the subsequent 
decision of the Grand Chamber in Maslov v Austria,91 the Court noted that the right to 
private life ‘also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an 
individual’s social identity’; it thus encompasses ‘the totality of social ties between 
settled migrants and the community in which they are living’.92 This does not, of 
course, mean that non-citizen long-term residents, including stateless persons, can 
never be deported: the seriousness of offending may well outweigh the interference 
with family and/or private life entailed in deportation.93 However, it does indicate that 
the traditionally wide discretion accorded states in such matters has been conditioned 
and restricted in significant ways by virtue of both international and regional human 
rights instruments.
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has held that irrespective of the 
reasons for wanting to deport a non-national, states parties to the ECHR have a 
positive obligation to secure an applicant’s admission and entry into a third country 
prior to deportation;94 they must pursue the matter ‘vigorously’.95 This is particularly 
the case where the applicant is stateless and therefore in a ‘particularly vulnerable 
situation’ because of a lack of consular protection.96 In such cases, the deporting state 
must do all it can to ensure the issuance and delivery of a travel document to the 
applicant by the former country of residence or country of birth, failing which the 
expulsion will breach article 8 of the ECHR.97
What is significant about these developments is that human rights courts and 
bodies are increasingly challenging the notion that the deportation of non-citizens, 
including stateless persons, is within the domaine réservé of states, at least where a 
state is arguably responsible for an individual due to the substantive ties between the 
88
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individual and the state which suggest that the individual has effective, if not 
technical, nationality. Indeed, the ECN goes so far as to recognize a right to 
nationality based on jus domicile (long-term residence) in certain situations.98 Such an 
approach clearly resonates with Goodwin-Gill’s fundamental argument that a 
substantive rather than formal approach to identifying the right to a nationality 
represents the most progressive and appropriate way forward. 
4.2. Arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, including as persecution
International human rights law generally prohibits deprivation nationality if it is 
arbitrary. The key provision is article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,99 which provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right 
to change his nationality.
The 1961 Convention explicitly prohibits the deprivation of nationality on the 
grounds of race, ethnicity, and religious or political orientation, and requires that 
deprivation for other causes be made contingent on having acquired nationality in 
another state.100 Protection against arbitrary deprivation can also be found in some 
form or another in a raft of binding international and regional legal instruments,101 
and is protected by the principle of non-discrimination in all core human rights 
treaties. 
Based on these various instruments, the UN Secretary-General’s report to the 
Human Rights Council stated that the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality had become a principle of customary international law;102 and so too the 
obligation to avoid statelessness. 103 In its Resolution 20/5 (2012), the Human Rights 
Council reaffirmed that arbitrary deprivation of nationality, especially on 
discriminatory grounds, is a violation of human rights law.104 In December 2015, the 
Human Rights Council highlighted statelessness as a concept that is inconsistent with 
and undermines the principle of the best interest of the child.105 
98
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99
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The scope of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality ‘rests on 
the interpretation of the concepts of arbitrariness and of deprivation of nationality’.106 
Deprivation of nationality refers generally to situations of withdrawal of citizenship 
(including ‘loss’) as well as denial of access to nationality.107 Arbitrariness goes 
beyond unlawfulness to cover standards of justice or due process considerations, and 
non-discrimination.108 In order not to be arbitrary, deprivation of nationality must be 
in conformity with domestic law, and comply with specific procedural and 
substantive standards of international human rights law, in particular the principle of 
proportionality, that is, it must serve a legitimate purpose, be the least intrusive 
means, and be proportionate to the interest to be protected. Furthermore, it must be 
issued in writing and be open to effective administrative or judicial review.109 In cases 
where deprivation of nationality takes place on the basis of race, colour, sex, descent, 
national or ethnic origin etc, it becomes both arbitrary and a breach of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to nationality.110 Thus, the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination are fundamental elements of international human 
rights law;111 the linkage between statelessness and discrimination is very strong.
The application of these principles to individual instances has been explored in 
a series of important cases examined by regional human rights courts. In Ivcher 
Bronstein v Peru, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that a deprivation 
of nationality constituted a violation of article 20 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (right to nationality), because the annulment of Mr Ivcher Bronstein’s 
nationality was not consensual and the procedure used to annul his nationality did not 
comply with provisions of domestic law, therefore rendering it arbitrary.112 In Yean 
and Bosico v Dominican Republic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled 
that the prohibition on racial discrimination, the principle of equality before the law, 
and the obligation to prevent, avoid and reduce statelessness apply to nationality. 113 
In Modise v Botswana, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found 
the repeated expulsion from one state without the right to enter another state, caused 
by the Government of Botswana’s failure to recognize the applicant’s nationality (by 
descent), to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, and to violate his rights to 
family life, freedom of movement, to leave and to return to his own country, property, 
and equal access to the public service of his country under the African Charter on 
106
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107
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109
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Human and Peoples’ Rights.114 In Nubian Children v Kenya, the African Committee 
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child held the practice of making 
children wait until they turn eighteen years of age to apply to acquire a nationality to 
be racially and ethnically discriminatory, as well as disproportionate and unnecessary 
to the protection of the state interest.115 Finally, although the ECHR does not 
guarantee a right to citizenship as such, in Genovese v Malta, the European Court of 
Human Rights recognized nationality as an inherent part of a person’s social identity, 
protected as such as an element of private life (article 8). It further held Maltese 
citizenship law to be discriminatory and a serious violation of human rights (article 14 
in conjunction with article 8) because it denied Maltese citizenship to an illegitimate 
child in cases where the illegitimate offspring was born to a non-Maltese mother and 
a Maltese father.116
In addition to these developments, there is a burgeoning jurisprudence in 
international refugee law, partly relying on these wider developments in human rights 
law, that is grappling with the extent to which the predicament of statelessness can 
give rise to a legitimate refugee claim.117 To this extent, case law globally is moving 
towards a more sophisticated approach to the connection between statelessness and 
refugee status, with the full potential of this connection being ripe for further analysis.
118
In sum, it is now understood that international law imposes strict limitations 
on states’ power to deprive nationals of their nationality: these are enshrined in 
numerous international human rights treaties and are subject to certain procedural and 
substantive standards. Goodwin-Gill’s call for a clearer understanding of the human 
rights implications of the deprivation of citizenship has thus proven prescient.
4.3. Deprivation of nationality: current challenges
International law provides for certain exceptional situations where a state may be 
acting lawfully in depriving a national of his or her nationality, even where such act 
would result in statelessness. However, these are closely circumscribed and generally 
limited to cases where nationality has been obtained by means of fraudulent conduct, 
false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to the applicant119; 
these exceptions must be interpreted restrictively and comply with the principle of 
proportionality.120
114
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Both the 1961 Statelessness Convention and the 1997 ECN further provide for 
the possibility of a state lawfully depriving its nationals of nationality on grounds of 
‘conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party’.121 The 
Explanatory Report to the 1997 ECN explains that:
Such conduct notably includes treason and other activities directed against the 
vital interests of the State concerned (for example work for a foreign secret 
service) but would not include criminal offences of a general nature, however 
serious they might be.
Article 8(3) of the 1961 Statelessness Convention specifies that
conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State can constitute a 
ground for deprivation of nationality only if it is an existing ground for 
deprivation in the internal law of the State concerned, which, at the time of 
signature, ratification or accession, the State specifies it will retain.122
A series of recent domestic legislative developments designed to strip citizenship 
from so-called ‘home-grown terrorists’ presents a contemporary threat to the 
otherwise positive trend away from arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. Legislation 
granting or strengthening governments’ ability to revoke the citizenship of suspected 
‘foreign fighters’ has been introduced in a range of jurisdictions including 
Australia,123 Canada,124 Israel,125 the United Kingdom126 and Belgium.127 The trend is 
nationality was obtained by deception, on condition that the decision to withdraw complies with the 
principle of proportionality).
121
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not linear: in France, a constitutional amendment allowing the stripping of nationality 
from convicted terrorists (whether born in France or naturalized), even if this would 
make them stateless, was rejected in March 2016,128 and the Canadian government 
has announced that it intends to repeal legislation that broadened its citizenship-
stripping powers.129 Nonetheless, such legislation continues to be proposed and 
debated in a wide range of states, and represents a contemporary threat to the notion 
that statelessness and indeed citizenship is a human rights issue. 
An extensive analysis of such developments is beyond the scope of this 
contribution. However, we briefly identify some specific concerns including 
inadequate safeguards for preventing statelessness, overly broad criteria for 
permitting deprivation of citizenship, and a trend towards a focus on technical aspects 
of nationality as opposed to a full appreciation of the human rights implications of 
this practice.
First, while some legislation, such as that in Canada and Australia, permits 
revocation only where the person concerned is a dual national, the UK legislation 
allows for the Secretary of State to strip someone of their British citizenship (resulting 
from naturalisation), even where this would render them stateless,130 relying on the 
article 8(3) exception in the 1961 Convention. However, even where legislation will 
not on its face result in statelessness, the practical effects may be different. In both 
Canada and the United Kingdom, the Minister/Secretary of State ‘must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a citizen of another country before 
pursuing revocation’,131 but such a precaution is absent from the Australian 
legislation. That is, while the Australian legislation theoretically applies to dual 
nationals, there is neither indication in the legislation nor any guidance in the 
background materials as to how the Australian Government will investigate whether 
or not a person is a dual national. Combined with the fact that the Australian 
legislation introduces the notion of constructive renunciation – namely, a person is 
deemed to have renounced their Australian citizenship immediately upon engaging in 
127
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the relevant conduct132 – there is a genuine risk that Australian nationals will be 
rendered stateless should this legislation be applied.
Second, the wider international law, especially human rights law, implications 
of such legislation has largely been inadequately addressed.133 Goodwin-Gill has 
recently observed that while the UK legislation permitting statelessness is not a 
violation by the UK of its international obligations concerning statelessness (because 
the UK made a declaration under article 8(3)(a) of the 1961 Convention at the time of 
ratification, and it has not ratified the 1997 ECN),134 the consequences of such act 
may well have implications in international law. Thus, a state may not deprive an 
individual of nationality ‘for the sole purpose of expelling him or her’.135 Neither may 
a state refuse to readmit an individual whom it stripped of his or her nationality whilst 
abroad; to do so ‘would be in breach of its obligations towards the receiving State’.136 
This general principle is included in General Comment No 27 of the Human Rights 
Committee.137 Deprivation of citizenship may also impact the right to respect for 
private and family life under article 8 of the ECHR, and the obligation to prosecute 
international crimes such as terrorist acts. It would also impact the right to diplomatic 
protection abroad.138 Further deprivation of citizenship and the concomitant denial of 
entry may well amount to arbitrary refusal of the right of a person to enter their own 
country pursuant to article 12(4) of the ICCPR.
Third, some procedural requirements have been insufficiently protected by 
states. In particular, to be lawful, deprivation of nationality must not be arbitrary, that 
is, it must be in accordance with the law and comply with certain standards of justice 
such as proportionality and non-discrimination. Hence, it is questionable whether the 
absence of a suspensive right of appeal, such as in the UK, particularly without the 
need for judicial confirmation of the decision before loss of nationality, satisfies 
international procedural standards.139 
5. CONCLUSION
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Although much has been achieved in the past two decades, Goodwin-Gill’s insightful 
analysis of the problem of statelessness as a human rights issue is still very relevant 
today. The number of accessions to the two main human rights treaties dealing with 
statelessness has increased significantly due to UNHCR’s leadership, but this does not 
necessarily mean that in reality things are improving. There remain very few domestic 
statelessness determination procedures in place, and there are still a large number of 
nationality laws that blatantly violate the principle of non-discrimination. 
Nonetheless, when we consider the number of landmark judgments delivered by 
regional human rights courts, particularly concerning arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality, resolutions by and reports to the UN Human Rights Council, and renewed 
international and institutional attention, we can conclude that statelessness as a human 
rights issue is indeed a concept whose time has come.
